Seigniorage, Inflation, and Reputation by Herschel I. Grossman & John B. Van Huyck




John B. Van Huyck
Working Paper No. 1505




The National Science Foundation has supported Grossman's work.The
Social Science Research Council and a Citicorp Graduate Fellowship
have supported Van Huyck's work.The research reported here is
part of the NBER's research program in Financial Markets and
Monetary Economics and project in Government Budget.Any opinions
expressed are those of the authors and not those of the National
Bureau of Economic Research.Seigniorage, Inflation,
and Reputation
ABSTRACT
NBER Working Paper #1505
November 1984
This paper derives a reputational equilibrium for
model in which the government obtains valuable sei
issuing fiat money in exchange for realresources.
insightful result is that, with contemporaneousperc
actual government behavior and immediate adjustment
balances to new information, the Friedman elasticity
maximal seigniorage is the reputational equilibrium.
generally, the analysis shows that the objective of
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Providence, RI02912 Providence, RI02912A useful positive theory of inflation not only must explain
why governments commonly expand the stock of fiat money at an
inflationary rate, but must account also for wide variations in
inflation over time and place.The observation that governments
desire seigniorage, which they obtain by issuing fiat money in
exchange for real resources, directs attention to a potentially
important element in such a theory.The importance of
seigniorage in public finance extends back to ancient times.
Fischer (1982) presents data for 120 countries that summarizes
the importance of seigniorage in recent years.A convenient way
to begin to analyze seigniorage as a motivation for inflation is
to ask the following question:If •a government wanted to
maximize the present value of its flow of seigniorage, at what
rate would it issue fiat money?
The essential analytical problem in answering this question
concerns the formulation of the government's choice set,
especially as it involves the determination of expected inflation
and the relation between expected inflation and actual money
issue.An old strategy——see, for example, Friedman
(1942, 1971)——treats the expected inflation rate, Ep, as a policy
variable, and assumes that the government issues money at the
rate that validates its choice of Ep.Using this framework,
Friedman obtains his elasticity formula.Specifically, if the
elasticity of the stock demand for real cash balances with
respect to the expected inflation rate is —Ep/h, where h is a
positive parameter, a government seeking to maximize seigniorage
would set Ep equal to h—g, where g is the growth rate of cash—2—
balance demand, and would issue money at the rate, h.This
policy would produce an actual inflation rate, p, equal to h—g,
and, for the case of g equal to zero, would imply an elasticity
of demand equal to minus unity.
Estimates of the inflation rate that would correspond to the
Friedman elasticity solution for maximal—seigniorge differ
widely.For example, for the case of g equal to zero, Friedman
(1971) suggests a range of 5% to 50% per annum, whereas Cagan
(1956) suggests a range of 11% to 44% per month and Barro (1972),
using an explicit inventory—theoretic analysis of money demand,
calculates an average value of about 150% per month.In any
event, it seems clear that actual inflation rates are usually
less than the Friedman elasticity solution, but that in some
historical cases the actual inflation rate has exceeded the
Friedman answer.
An easy way to extend the Friedman framework to account for
inflation rates less than the Friedman elasticity solution is to
assume that most governments, for whatever reason, are averse to
high expected inflation rates and, hence, forego maximal
seigniorage.Inflation rates in excess of the Friedman
elasticity solution are a bigger problem for this analysis.
Friedman (1971) suggests that such episodes reflect unusually
high discount rates for future seigniorage, which induce
governments to obtain more seigniorage now at the expense of less
seigniorage later by taking advantage of lags in the response of
real cash balances to accelerated money issue.Friedman,
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More recent analytical developments derive from related
reservations about the treatment of expectations in the Friedman
framework.Calvo (1978) stresses that the Friedman elasticity
solution describes policies that are not time consistent and,
hence, would be relevant only if a government could bind itself
to fulfill its commitment regarding future inflation rates.In
reality, such an irrevocable commitment is not feasible.Indeed,
it would seem to contradict the concept of sovereignty.
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descriptively realistic.Even in hyperinflationS governments
rarely issue money at the fastest physically possible rate.
Moreover, in the Calvo framework, aversion to highexpected
inflation cannot explain low inflation because the government
takes inflationary expectations as given.In response to this
problem, Barro (1983) assumes that governments are averse to
inflation, whether expected or not, and he derives a variation on
the Calvo result in which the inflation rate is lessthan p by an
amount that depends on the strength of this aversionrelative to
the desire for seigniorage. s Barro recognizes,however, a
weakness in his theory is the lack of a convincingrationale for
strong aversion to unexpected inflation.
The present paper reconsiders the maximal seigniorage
question within a more general model of the determi nation of
expected inflation and the relation between expected inflation
and actual money issue.In this model, inflationary expectations
are not a proximate policyvariable as in the Friedman framework,
but are also not independent of the choiceof money issue as in
the Calvo/Barro framework.Instead, the model assumes that
policy actions and inflationary expectations are linkedthrough
the government's reputation.Given this linkage, the Calvo/Barro
outcome, although time consistent, wouldbe myopic and,
consequently, would not be the actual result of a foresighted
government's desire to maximize the present value of its
seigniorage, even if the government cannot explicitly bind itself
to fulfill commitments.The answer to the maximal—seigniorage
question instead takes the form of a reputational equilibrium in
which policy is both time consistent and foresighted.—5—
In what follows, section I develops the basic analytical
framework.Sections II and III replicate Friedman's analysis and
Calvo's analysis.Section IV formulates the model of reputation
arid derives the reputational equilibrium.Finally, section V
summarizes the main properties of this equilibrium and discusses
some extensions that would characterize a full positive theory of
inflation.
I.Analytical Framework
The maximal—seigniorage question assumes that the
government's objective for period t is to maximize
(1) S= E exp(_rti)s+t
i=O
whereSt is the present value of current arid future seigniorage,
s. is the seigniorage obtained in periodt+i, r is the annual
rate at which the government discounts future seigniorage, and
tisthe length of a period in units of years.The government's
proximate control variable is current fiat money issue, and its
objective implies that it takes account of the effects ofcurrent
money issue on both current seigniorage and future seigniorage.
The analysis assumes that the fastest physically possiblerate of
money issue, although finite, is very large.
As the analysis below shows, an important potential
explanation for differences in inflation rates is that different
governments have different discount rates.A dramatic example is
that a government fighting a major war, especiallyone that—6
threatened its survival, would be likely to havea relatively
high discount rate.For simplicity, the present analysis treats
the discount rate as constant over time, althoughthe same
results would also apply if the discount rate followeda random
walk.In general, correctly allowing for the possibility of
changes in the discount rate over time would presenta more
ambitious modelling problem than does thepresent comparison of
the implications of different constant discount rates.(For more
on this issue, see Grossman (1984)).
Assuming that fiat money is produced atzero cost,
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To model the constraint on real cash balances, assume that
the demand for real cash balances depends logarithmically on the
expected inflation rate, and that the price level adjusts to




whereEtipt+i is the public's expectation of p÷ conditional
on its perception of government behavior formed in period t-l,
and g is an annual growth rate that captures the effects of all
other factors, e.g. population and income growth and developments
in financial technology, that influence the demand for real cash
balances.The analysis treats g and the parameter h as fixed and
focuses on inflationary expectations as the link between policy,
i.e. the inflation rate, and real cash balances.(Nichols (1974)
analyses the use of financial regulations to influence parameters
like g and h.)
This formulation of demand reflects the observation that the
holders of real cash balances are atomistic agents who cannot
individually influence the government behavior that produces
inflation.Consequently, the demand for real cash balances does
not incorporate any strategic elements, and the government plays
what is analogous to a game against nature.
The assumption that the expectation relevant for current
demand is based on a perception formed last period provides a
simple way to model a lag in either the perception of actual—8
government behavior or in the ad
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t,thelength of a single time
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lag.
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period.Consideration of the
trevealsthe significance ofthis
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The final component needed to complete the analytical
framework is the determination of inflationary expectations.
analysis assumes that these expectations are based on the
public's perception of the strategy that the government employs
in attempting to maximize seigniorage.The different answers to
the maximal—seigniorage question discussed in the following
sections reflect differences in these strategies.
Theln(l+th)
(6) p'=Ep'=—_______ — g.
I
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III.Calvo's Analysis
In reality, governments do not, and by their nature probably
cannot, irrevocably commit themselves to specific inflation
rates, or to any other policy rules.Indeed, the power to
abrogate commitments without having to answer to a higher
authority seems to be an essential property of sovereignty.
Consequently, the Friedman strategy of treating inflationary
expectations as a choice variable does not seem to provide a
relevant analysis of seigniorage.
In developing an alternative to Friedman's strategy, Calvo
supposes that,in addition to being incapable of credible
commitments, the government ignores any effect that its current
actions have on expectations of its future actions.In this
case, given the fixed nonstochastic structure of the model, the
maximal seigniorage problem would amount to choosingp to
maximize S, taking Ep as given.Equation (5)implies that the
partial derivativeaS/ap is positive for all finite values
of p.Thus, the critical value of p for this problem is ,which
is the Calvo answer to the maximal—seigniorage question.It says
that,if the government took inflationary expectations as given,
the desire to maximize seigniorage would lead it to inflate at
the fastest possible rate, independently of the path of
inflationary expectations.
Assuming that the public correctly perceives how the
government behaves,Ep in this case would also equalp. Thus,
substituting for bothEp and p in equation (5) gives the
value ofSt implied by the Calvo analyses.In the limit for an— 11
increasingly large value of ,thisvalue ofSt approaches
zero.Calvo's analysis shows that the result of taking
inflationary expectations as give.n is "suboptimal" in the sense
that any inflation rate less thanp (but greater than —g) would
yield more seigniorage, if the government could convince the
public to expect that inflation rate.The Friedman answer p',is
an example of such an inflation rate.
IV.Reputattonal Equilibrium
As discussed above, both theoretical considerations as well
as the facts of inflationary experience suggest thatthe Friedman
analysis and the Calvo analysis are each missing essential
elements of the correct answer to the maxtmal—seigniorage
question.To capture these elements, suppose that, although the
government cannot directly control inflationary expectations by
committing itself to future inflation rates, its current actions
nevertheless influence expectations about its future actions.
The linkage between current actions andexpectations is the
government's reputation.Given this linkage, a foresighted
government would consider how its current actionsaffect its
reputation and how its reputation affects its futureability to
obtain seigniorage.Only a government that ignored its
reputation wOuld behave as in the Calvoanalysis, but such
behavior would be myopic.
To model the determination ofthe government's reputation,
assume that the public presumesthat the government's behavior
will always be foresighted as long as the governmenthas never— 12
acted myopically in the past.If, however, the government ever
acts myopically, then the public withdraws this presumption and
expects myopic behavior in the future.These assumptions imply
that
(7) for t 0,Etlpt+l
=
pand





where the initial issue of fiat money is in period t=—1 (making
pthe first observation of inflation) andpis the inflation
rate that a foresighted seigniorage maximizing government would
choose.Given the fixed nonstochastic structure of the model,
*
pis independent of t.
The essential properties of this model of reputation are
that private agents are backward looking in determining the
expected mode of government behavior, foresighted or myopic, but
are forward looking in determining the expected inflation rate.
The potential loss of reputation for being foresighted creates
the distinction between foresighted and myopic behavior and,
also, by penalizing myopic behavior with a sharp reduction in the
demand for real cash balances, provides an incentive for
foresighted behavior.This potential penalty emerges
automatically from the actions of individual, atomistic holders
of cash balances, who form inflationary expectations according toforesighted seigniorage—max
part of an implicit program
S, subject to equation (7)
reputational equilibrium in
inflationary expectations,
least as large as it would
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equation (7).The potential penalty does not require a willful
enforcement decision by members of the public.This property
reflects the observation that the government plays what is
analogous to a game against nature.(A possible extension in
this model of reputation might include assumptions aboutactions
that a government could take in order to regaina lost
reputation.)
Given this model of reputation, the problem fora
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equilibria, thenp equalsp'. Alternately, ifp'is not in this
*
set,pis the member of this set closest top'. This result obtains
becauseStdecreases monotonically as Ep diverges from p', given
that inflationary expectations are validated.
*
Becausepis independent of t,the analyses can focus on period
*
zero.As a member of the set of possible reputational equilibria,p
satisfies
(8) S0
where S is the value ofS0 that results from settingp0 equal
to pandS0 is the value ofS0
:hatwould result from setting
p0 equal top .SubstitutingpforEp and p in equation (5)
yields
— — 1 —expT(p-1-g)]
—exp
h 1 —exp—T(r—g)]
To calculate ,observethat, by settingp0 equals to ,the
government obtains in period zero an amount of seigniorage given by
=exp- j{i -exp[-r(+g)]}.
At the same time this action causes the government to lose its good
reputation.Consequently, future seigniorage, beginning in period
one, corresponds to the result of Calvo's analysis.Thus, S0 equals
the value ofS0 obtained by substituting for both Ep and p in















This result obtains because, with continuous adjustment
cash balances, the model of reputation given by equation (7)
that by settingp0 equal to the government would cause an
immediate reduction of real cash balances to the levelassociated with
myopic behavior.Consequently, even though inflationary expectations
* areinitiallyequal top ,theunanti.cipated inflation associated
with settingp0 equal to p would not produce any extra seigniorage
even in the short run.
This experiment of allowing ttoapproach zero, because it
equivalent to letting the demand for real cashbalances in period






these limiting values, recalling also that
and given that is larger than h—g, reveals that
* issatisfied forpequal top'. In other words, in






the perception of actual government behavior or in the adjustment
real cash balances is essential for explaining inflation rates in
of p'. Remarkably, with tequalto zero, the comparison ofS0
does not involve r.Thus, p' would be the reputational equilib
in this case no matter how high is the government's discount rate.
this respect, the effect of unexpected inflation on seigntorage is
fundamentally different from its effect on the real cost of servicing
nominal debts that mature in the future.If the government's
objectives included minimization of such real debt servicing costs,
the reputational equilibrium for inflation would depend on the
government's discount rate, even with no lags in perception or
adjustment.)
Consider next the implications for condition (8), with a positive
exp(—--).
In effect, by settingp0 equal top, the government initially
obtains as seigniorage the entire value of the initial real cash
balances that the public holds on the presumption that the government
is foresighted.Future seigniorage however, is zero.
Accordingly, in this case condition (8) becomes
1 —exp_Tp+g*>1 1 —exp—tIr—gj
*
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value of h and a low value of r,is important because it there
the amounts of future seigniorage associated withp'relative
initial seigniorage associated with settingp0 equal to p.A 1
value of r—g is important because it increases the importance of




closest top', and, thus,
positive values of tand
*
psatisfies
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V.Summary and Extensions
An expected inflation rate in the set of poten
equilibria has the property that the present value
at least as large if the government validates this
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large flow of seigniorage by making the inflation rate higher than the
public expects.A foresighted seigniorage—Inaximizing government
choses from this set the inflation rate that produces the highest
present value of seigniorage.This inflation rate is the reputational
equilibrium.
The above analysis derives the reputational equilibrium based on
a model of reputation in which the public presumes that government
behavior will be foresighted as long as the government has never
behaved myopically.If, however, the government were ever to behave
myopically, the public expects myopic behavior in the future.This
expectation would eliminate or reduce possibilities for future
seigniorage.
Given the model of reputation, the analysis derives two
sufficient conditions under whi
inflation rate that generalizes
the maximal—seigniorage problem.
public perceives actual governme
adjusts real cash balances immed
sufficient condition is that the
exceed the growth rate of money
rate plus the growth rate.The
effect of the potential loss of
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This extension would rationalize
rates typically seem to be less
implied by the single objective
Another worthwhile extensi
reasons other than a desire for
government to try to make thei
expects.In a related analys s
(1983) analyse a reputational eq
differences in the rate at which future
ted.One obvious extension of the analysis,
by Friedman, would assume that, for whatever
is averse to a high expected inflation rate.
the observation that actual inflation
than the reputational equilibrium
of maximizing seigniorage.
on would incorporate into the
seigniorage that might tempt
nflation rate higher than the
along these lines, Barro and
uilibrium for inflation that
1.
on increasing aggregate employment and reducing the real cost of— 20—
servicingthe public debt as objectives of government policy.Adding
these additional motivations for unexpected inflation to theabove
analyses would have the same effectas a longer lag in the adjustment
of real cash balances or a larger discount rate for futureseigniorge
in raising the inflation rate that is the reputatiorialequilibrium.
A more ambitious extension of the analysis would be to model
relevant parameters like the discount rate for future seigniorageas
stochastic processes.This development would permit explicit analysis
of variations in the inflation rateover time.— 21
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